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ccording to the U.S. Census Bureau, about 
1 million people immigrated to the U.S. in 
2001—a number not too far from the record 
1.3 million who arrived in 1907. Like their 
fellow newcomers of long ago, latter-day immigrants 
generally come here for one reason: to seek a better life. 
Debate still rages today – as it did a century ago – over 
immigrants’ effect on a host country’s economic and 
social structures. Nevertheless, several factors make the 
current immigration inflows distinctive.  In this article, 
Albert Saiz discusses immigration’s impact on a receiving 




The Impact of Immigration
on American Cities:
An Introduction to the Issues
The United States is a 
country of immigrants. A majority of 
Americans trace their roots to people 
who journeyed from far away to seek a 
better life. And today’s immigrants to 
the United States are doing the same. 
Recent immigrants tend to concen-
trate in a handful of metropolitan 
areas, and immigration has become a 
salient feature of these cities. Accord-
ing to the Census Bureau, about 1 mil-
lion people immigrated to the U.S. in 
2001. That figure was not too far from 
the record 1.3 million immigrants who 
arrived in 1907 (Figure). However, 
immigration at the start of the century 
had a relatively greater impact as the 
U.S. was much less populated. Relative 
immigration rates were at their high-
est during the first decade of the 20th 
century: 11 immigrants per year for 
each 1,000 inhabitants, compared with 
five per 1,000 in the last decade of the 
century. The U.S. was absorbing twice 
the proportion of immigrants than it 
is today. 
Nevertheless, several factors 
make the current immigration inflows 
distinctive. First, the U.S. government 
reduced immigration inflows drasti-
cally at the beginning of the Great De-
pression in 1929. Current immigration 
levels are the highest in the memories 
of most Americans. Second, the coun-
tries of origin of immigrants are more 
diverse today than in the 19th and 
early 20th centuries. The traditional 
countries of origin (Germany, Holland, 
Italy, Ireland, UK, and central Europe) 
are no longer important sources of 
immigration. Third, even if immigra-
tion inflows are small relative to the 
population levels, they will still have 
an important impact on population 
growth. If current immigration rates 
are sustained, two-thirds of population 
growth in the United States could be 
accounted for by immigration by 2050.
Are such projections realistic? 
That depends on future immigration 
policies. Any time immigration has 
fueled a country’s population, it has 
also sparked heated debates over the 
desirability of further immigration. For 
example, on September 1, 1910, the 
Wall Street Journal ran the following 
story on the front page:
“The Labor party in the 
colony of Victoria, Australia, which is 
practically the dominating influence in 
the Government, is protesting against 
the immigration of skilled artisans 
when they add to the congested popu-
lation of Melbourne. It is our belief 
that these immigrants would in time 
tend to distribute themselves to points 
where they were more needed, but 
the attitude of the Labor party is by no 
means unreasonable” [emphasis added].
More than 90 years later, im-
migration continues to be a furiously 
debated topic. Public opinion does not 
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always favor letting more people in. 
Economists Kenneth Scheve of Yale 
University and Matthew Slaughter of 
Dartmouth College have demonstrated 
that less skilled workers favor limit-
ing immigrant inflows into the U.S.  
Thomas Bauer, Magnus Lofstrom, 
and Klaus Zimmermann, from Bonn 
University, also report that survey 
respondents in OECD countries show 
substantial support for immigration 
limits.1
This article provides back-
ground for a reasoned discussion of the 
impact of immigration. Economists 
and other social scientists have pro-
duced substantial research on immi-
gration’s impact on local economies. 
Individual and collective preferences 
for policies should be strongly founded 
on the available evidence.
Economists generally agree 
that a worldwide labor market without 
any border restrictions is efficient: that 
is, people achieve a maximum level of 
production of goods given the exist-
ing availability of resources. The issue 
with immigration is its impact on the 
distribution of real income. Who are 
the winners and the losers worldwide? 
Can inhabitants of a country that 
allows immigration lose because of 
it? Regardless of the average impact 
on a country, what is the distribution 
within a country of gains and costs 
arising from immigration?
This article will deal with 
these questions from the point of view 
of countries receiving immigrants. 
Although other important questions, 
such as the impact on countries send-
ing immigrants and the progress and 
welfare of immigrants themselves, 
should also be part of the discussion 
on immigration policies, they will not 
be covered here. We will examine 
immigration’s impact on host coun-
tries’ labor and housing markets, their 
fiscal systems, and social interactions. 
IMMIGRATION’S IMPACT
ON LABOR MARKETS 
Immigration’s impact on labor 
markets can be gauged by wages or 
employment. Does immigration affect 
wages? How? Does it influence the 
employment prospects of natives or 
change the unemployment rate?
Wages. By far, most of the 
economic literature on immigration 
has concentrated on its impact on 
labor markets, specifically wages. Do 
immigrants compete with natives in 
the labor market and drive real wages 
down?
To answer this question 
we need to think first about what 
distinguishes international labor flows 
(emigration and immigration) from 
international trade. Actually, the 
United States can use foreign labor 
by importing products produced by 
workers in the rest of the world. In 
theory, international trade of goods 
FIGURE 
Immigrants in the U.S. by Decade
Immigration continues to be a furiously
debated topic. Public opinion does not
always favor letting more people in.
1 OECD, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, was formed by 
the governments of a group of medium- to 
high-income countries to “tackle the economic, 
social, and governance challenges of a globalized 
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and services could equalize the 
wages and other payments made to 
the different factors of production 
worldwide. After all, why would a firm 
in the U.S. pay more for an input, 
such as labor, when it faces price 
competition from producers in other 
countries? 
In practice, under current 
economic and political conditions, 
this so-called factor-price equalization 
does not happen. Why? First, there 
are a number of trade barriers, such 
as import quotas and tariffs. Second, 
there are products, such as personal 
services and local public goods, 
that cannot be traded and thus do 
not face international competition. 
Third, education levels, technological 
developments, and institutions have 
proved difficult to transplant. Many 
countries do not possess the skills 
or technology to compete in some 
product markets.
Thus, the impact of immigra-
tion will not be quite the same as that 
of importing goods produced by foreign 
labor.  For this reason, and given the 
relatively small size of exports and im-
ports in the United States, labor econ-
omists have concentrated on models 
of the economy without international 
trade. These economic models, which 
are simplified representations of the 
economy (as a map is a simplified 
representation of a geographic area), 
help us understand the effects of 
changes in fundamental variables, such 
as population, on outcomes of interest, 
such as wages. According to Harvard 
economist George Borjas, these models 
indicate there are positive overall gains 
to natives from immigration but point 
to a distributive impact: There may be 
winners and losers within the native 
population. 
The simplest model consid-
ers a single type of labor and a fixed 
amount of capital.2  This model pre-
dicts overall gains from immigration. 
The increase in labor supply exerts 
downward pressure on wages, but the 
gains to firms from greater availability 
of labor more than offset native work-
ers’ wage losses. The distribution of the 
benefits from immigration hinges on 
the initial distribution of firms’ shares 
of ownership. For instance, if every-
one is a worker but also an investor, 
everyone experiences net gains from 
the availability of more people who 
produce at a lower cost.
But, in reality, the amount 
of capital in the economy is not fixed. 
When we allow capital to adjust freely 
(maybe because of the availability of 
foreign capital), results are different. 
Suppose that if we doubled the total 
amount of resources devoted to pro-
duction, we would double the amount 
we produce.3 In this setup, immigra-
tion does not generate any change in 
wages and does not generate economic 
gains or losses to natives. This happens 
because as the amount of available 
labor increases via immigration, inves-
tors find it desirable to increase the 
amount of capital as well, so that the 
amount of capital per worker is kept 
at the initial level before immigration. 
This level was the one that minimized 
the costs of production, and immigra-
tion doesn’t change that.
For example, imagine that 
the population of a country doubles 
because of immigration. Capital per 
worker will adjust to the initial level 
(the level that is optimal for investors). 
The new economy, after immigra-
tion, will just be a duplicate of the old 
economy! Total gross domestic product 
(GDP) will double, but per capita GDP 
will stay the same. Wages will remain 
unchanged and so will the dividends 
paid to each owner of capital. 
An even more realistic model 
takes into account the existence of 
several types of labor. Take, for 
example, the case in which there are 
two types of labor: highly skilled and 
unskilled. The availability of formal 
education and knowledge, which help 
determine the level of skills that a 
country’s workers have, is approxi-
mately fixed in the medium run. 
In this situation, and if new 
capital can be put into place, immigra-
tion will benefit natives only if the 
distribution of skills in the immigrant 
population (for example, the propor-
tion of people who are low skilled) 
is different from that of the native 
population. If the skill composition of 
immigrants and natives is identical, 
we are back to a “replicated economy” 
scenario: Doubling the country’s 
population just doubles the economy 
without any changes in income per 
capita. But if the composition of skilled 
and unskilled workers is different in 
the immigrant and the native popu-
lations, relative wages will change. 
For example, if immigrants tended 
to be more highly skilled, this would 
increase the relative supply of highly 
skilled individuals, reducing wages for 
the highly skilled and increasing wages 
for low-skilled workers.
2 Capital refers to investments in durable 
productive assets, such as computers, factories, 
and so on.
 3 In economists’ jargon, this technology exhibits 
constant returns to scale. Such productive 
technology seems to represent fairly well 
the production process at the national level. 
However, at the local level, for example, in 
metropolitan areas, this need not be the 
case. See Satyajit Chatterjee’s article on 
agglomeration economies.
The relative skills 
of immigrants in the 
U.S. have been
decreasing since
the 1960s. 16   Q4  2003 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q4  2003   17 www.phil.frb.org
In reality, economists have 
worried about the potential impact 
of immigration on low-skilled natives. 
George Borjas, one of the most active 
economists studying immigration in 
the past decade, has pointed to the fact 
that the relative skills of immigrants 
in the U.S. have been decreasing since 
the 1960s. To be sure, the United 
States attracts a good deal of highly 
skilled professionals, such as doctors, 
computer programmers, engineers, 
scientists, and Ph.D. economists. In 
1990, 26.2 percent of male immigrants 
25 years or older were college graduates 
(the same proportion as natives). Nev-
ertheless, the share of immigrants with 
less than a high school diploma was 
37.1 percent, much higher than the 
same proportion for natives (14.1 per-
cent). Is the influx of such a relatively 
low-skilled population affecting wages 
for low-skilled workers? Considerable 
research has been devoted to answer-
ing this question.
Most studies have compared 
the change in wages in cities that 
receive major immigration inflows to 
the change in wages in other areas. 
These are generally known as area 
studies. Surprisingly, the results only 
yield evidence of a weak negative 
association between immigration and 
wages in the sectors and metropolitan 
areas where immigrants tend to find 
employment.
Area studies have been 
criticized because they do not take 
into account firms’ and immigrants’ 
responses to changing economic 
conditions. If, for instance, immi-
grants are systematically attracted to 
areas that are experiencing economic 
booms, we should not expect to see a 
clear-cut negative association between 
immigration and wages. Without im-
migration, wages may have been higher 
in these areas, but there is no way to 
disentangle the impact of immigration 
from the positive effect of a booming 
economy. Similarly, firms that tend to 
use immigrant labor will move to areas 
where immigrants tend to concentrate, 
increasing the demand for labor in 
those areas.
David Card, a labor econo-
mist at Berkeley, studied the impact 
of the Mariel boatlift on wages and 
employment in Miami, Florida. Be-
tween May and September 1980, about 
125,000 Cuban immigrants arrived in 
southern Florida. The sudden inflow 
of people arriving in boats (balsas in 
Spanish and, hence, the name balseros 
for contemporary Cuban immigrants 
who follow the same route) resulted 
from the Cuban government’s deci-
sion to allow free emigration from the 
island’s port of Mariel. Card estimates 
that about 50 percent of the Mariel 
immigrants settled in Miami in 1980. 
Initially, this represented a sudden 
7 percent increase in the city’s labor 
force. By 1983, many more resettled 
refugees had found their way south 
to Miami. Mariel immigrants were 
relatively unskilled, both in terms 
of formal education and fluency in 
English. The advantages of studying 
that massive immigration episode, in 
light of the criticisms of area studies, 
are that its timing was independent of 
the evolution of Miami’s economy and 
that firms could not have predicted it 
in advance.
 But Card’s study suggests 
that even a major shock of low-skilled 
immigrants such as that represented by 
the Mariel boatlift did not change the 
relative wages of low-skilled workers in 
Miami compared with those in similar 
metropolitan areas.
Still, some economists 
think that looking at specific high-
immigration metropolitan areas 
is not enough to learn about the 
general impact of immigrants on 
wages. George Borjas, teaming with 
Larry Katz and Richard Freeman 
from Harvard, argues that the 
mobility of natives may counteract 
the local effects of immigration on 
wages. If immigration puts downward 
pressure on wages in the areas where 
immigrants concentrate, natives may 
decide to leave or may be less willing 
to move into these areas. In this sense 
local economies are interconnected: 
The impact of immigration on wages 
will be spread over the entire nation 
as natives move in response to 
immigration inflows into specific areas.
Borjas, Katz, and Freeman 
estimated the national impact of 
immigration on wages. They used a 
simplified model of the economy and 
estimates of the general responsiveness 
of wages to changes in the supply of 
low-skilled workers in order to approxi-
mate the impact of immigration. They 
report a modest impact. Wages for 
high-school dropouts would have been 
about 3 percent higher relative to wages 
for other workers in 1990 without any 
immigration in the 1980s. Notice that 
this implies that relative wages for oth-
er workers (those with at least a high 
school diploma) would have been lower 
without the immigration of the 1980s. 
However, as George Borjas pointed 
Some economists think that looking at specific 
high-immigration metropolitan areas is not 
enough to learn about the general impact of 
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out, the estimates from the Harvard 
trio can be subject to criticism.4 Their 
calculations are rather uncertain, since 
they rely on their model’s adequacy 
and the accuracy of its parameters. 
We are left with the 
impression that the empirical 
evidence is inconclusive as to the 
actual magnitude of the impact of 
immigration on wages. However, it is 
fair to argue that immigration may 
have had a modest negative impact 
on the wage growth of low-skilled 
individuals in the United States and 
a corresponding positive impact on 
wages for the rest.
Employment. Economists 
have also investigated the association 
between immigration and employment. 
Does immigration reduce the propor-
tion of natives who are working or ac-
tively looking for jobs, usually referred 
to as labor force participation? Does 
immigration generate unemployment? 
Immigration affects labor 
force participation only if wage effects 
are sizable. In other words, if immigra-
tion substantially reduced the wages of 
a particular group, some individuals 
in that group may decide to withdraw 
from the labor force. Similarly, if 
immigration substantially increased 
the wages of a particular group, some 
individuals in that group may decide to 
enter the labor force. In practice, since 
wage effects are very small, we expect 
the impact on labor participation to be 
minor. 
Using an area study approach, 
David Card has looked at such an 
impact. Confirming what the evidence 
from the research on wages suggests, 
he finds that immigration has a very 
small impact on the employment of 
natives in the same skill category.
Robert Fairlie of the Univer-
sity of California at Santa Cruz and 
Bruce Meyer of Northwestern Uni-
versity have found that immigration 
can have a negative effect on native 
self-employment. Immigrants are more 
likely than natives to own and operate 
small businesses such as convenience 
stores and restaurants. However, these 
authors also found that immigration 
does not affect self-employment by 
African-Americans. Since immigra-
tion barely affects total employment 
and wages, the results imply that some 
natives prefer to take on other, more 
available jobs rather than compete 
with immigrants’ small businesses.
The effect of immigration on 
unemployment depends on the nature 
of the labor market. Institutional and 
social factors sometimes make quick 
transitions from unemployment to jobs 
difficult. For example, the geographical 
distribution of jobs may not correspond 
to the geographical distribution of 
population (so jobs may not necessarily 
be where people are). Or some people 
might be unwilling to move from 
their hometown and would rather stay 
unemployed.
In a market with few such 
institutional and social factors, im-
migration should not affect unemploy-
ment. Economists agree that this is 
the case in the United States. A large 
majority of people looking for a job at 
current wages are usually able to find 
a job after some searching. Moreover, 
according to Borjas, immigration may 
“grease the wheels” of the labor mar-
ket. Immigrants are much more mobile 
than natives and respond more quickly 
to changes in the economic situation. 
This may speed the process of match-
ing people to jobs within the country.
 If institutional and social 
factors associated with high unem-
ployment rates are present, as is the 
case in many European countries, one 
might suspect that immigrants to those 
countries are competing with natives 
for jobs. There is no empirical evidence 
that this is actually the case.5 The 
explanation is akin to the argument 
advanced when we discussed what 
would happen if we doubled a coun-
try’s population. Immigration increases 
the scale of the economy, but it needn’t 
change the unemployment rate. 
IMMIGRATION'S IMPACT ON 
THE HOUSING MARKET
As we discussed earlier, us-
ing labor from other countries is not 
exclusively a matter of immigration. 
Trading goods between countries 
also means using foreign labor. What 
sets immigration apart from trade is 
its residential aspect: immigration 
involves foreign workers living in the 
U.S. Therefore, one might expect to 
find that immigration has a major ef-
fect on the local housing market.
Does immigration affect 
housing prices? Immigration certainly 
increases the demand for housing. Its 
impact on prices depends on what 
economists call the elasticity of hous-
ing supply—that is, the sensitivity of 
the supply of housing to changes in 
price. In some markets, only small 
The effect of immigration on unemployment 
depends on the nature of the labor market.
5 See, for instance, Rudolf Winter-Ebmer and 
Josef Zweimuller’s article, which reports a lack 
of evidence that immigration has a negative 
impact on youth unemployment in Austria.
4 See George Borjas’ 2002 Harvard University 
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price hikes are necessary to increase 
supply enough to accommodate in-
creasing demand. In these cases, supply 
is very elastic. In other markets, where 
supply isn’t as elastic, small changes in 
demand translate into higher prices. In 
these markets, it takes a much greater 
increase in prices for supply to respond 
to the increased demand.
Studies in housing economics 
demonstrate that, at the national level, 
the supply of housing is fairly elastic. 
Increases in population that are spread 
out over the country needn’t translate 
into higher housing prices. The supply 
of housing increases sufficiently with 
small changes in price. But while hous-
ing supply may be relatively elastic at 
the national level, it may be much more 
inelastic in specific locations. Plus, 
immigrants tend to concentrate in 
densely populated metropolitan areas 
where housing supply is typically fairly 
inelastic (see Table and map). This im-
plies that housing rents and prices may 
be expected to grow faster in response 
to population growth in these areas.
My research has focused on 
the impact of immigration on local 
housing rents and prices. I started 
by looking at the Mariel boatlift. It 
is an interesting episode because of 
its magnitude and exact timing. It 
is also important because, as David 
Card convincingly demonstrated, it 
is an example of the small impact of 
even massive immigration on wages. 
My research shows that one year after 
the Mariel boatlift, rents in Miami 
TABLE
MAJOR IMMIGRANT METROPOLITAN AREAS (1983-1997)
The table shows the main 20 destinations of legal immigrants in the 15 years from 1983 to 1997. Impact is defined as the 
total number of immigrants as a proportion of the initial (1983) population. Philadelphia is the only metropolitan area 
in the Third District that makes it to the top of the list. However, immigration in Philadelphia is not very important in 
terms of its population impact over this period (3.23 percent) compared to other close major metropolitan areas such as 
New York, the Northern New Jersey cities, and Washington.     
   
Rank  MSA  Population in 1983  Immigrants 83-97  Impact* 
  1  New York  8,491,429  1,653,393  19.47% 
  2  Los Angeles-Long Beach  8,182,905  1,111,542  13.58% 
  3  Chicago  7,301,085  476,754  6.53% 
  4  Miami  1,776,909  455,085  25.61% 
  5  Washington, D.C.  3,809,206  359,918  9.45% 
  6  San Francisco  1,570,619  268,688  17.11% 
  7  Anaheim-Santa Ana  2,171,929  253,008  11.65% 
  8  Houston  3,205,171  230,027  7.18% 
  9  San Jose  1,419,521  215,957  15.21% 
10  Boston  5,383,370  203,951  3.79% 
11  Oakland  1,908,848  196,428  10.29% 
12  San Diego  2,126,091  184,192  8.66% 
13  Newark  1,953,893  172,904  8.85% 
14  Philadelphia  4,818,838  155,583  3.23% 
15  Bergen-Passaic  1,301,487  150,603  11.57% 
16  Nassau-Suffolk  2,621,547  139,701  5.33%
17  Dallas  2,432,840  134,703  5.54% 
18  Seattle-Bellevue-Everett  1,778,460  124,525  7.00% 
19  Detroit  4,224,650  112,249  2.66% 
20  Jersey City  568,869  111,619  19.62%
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increased 7 percent to 11 percent. I 
have obtained similar results for other 
immigrant destinations in the United 
States. An immigration inflow that 
amounts to 1 percent of the city’s 
population is associated with increases 
in housing values and rents of about 1 
percent.
Immigration’s effects on hous-
ing markets are much more substan-
tive than its effects on labor markets. 
Remember that one explanation for 
why immigration may not have an 
impact on labor markets is that some 
natives avoid areas where immigrants 
concentrate, such as New York or Los 
Angeles. Although there is no defini-
tive consensus on how the internal 
flows of native workers respond to 
immigration, a National Research 
Council report on immigration has 
argued that “competing native work-
ers migrate out of the areas to which 
immigrants move.” Given the fact 
MAP
IMMIGRATION IN THE THIRD DISTRICT
The map shows the number of immigrants as a percentage of population by postal zip code. The data correspond to the 
15-year period starting in 1983. It is easy to see that immigrants tend to cluster in metropolitan areas (delimited in the 
map). Many areas of the Third District are not exposed to immigration. The main areas of attraction are northern New 
Jersey and Philadelphia. 20   Q4  2003 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q4  2003   21 www.phil.frb.org
that immigration doesn’t affect wages, 
higher housing rents can help explain 
why certain areas might become less 
attractive to natives.
In the short run, the results 
have implications for the distribution 
of real income through the housing 
market. Homeowners stand to gain 
from immigration while renters 
experience slightly higher prices. 
But there are reasons to think that 
these effects may disappear in the 
long run. Remember the idea of an 
economy as an interconnected system 
of cities. When a city becomes more 
expensive, some people will find it 
less attractive to live there. In time, 
immigrants become natives in terms of 
tastes and motivations. Thus, in time, 
some natives and immigrants can be 
expected to leave immigrant areas for 
less expensive areas. Housing demand 
will decrease in immigrant cities and 
increase in the rest of the country. 
Since supply is highly elastic at the 
national level, the long-run impact of 
immigration on national housing prices 
may be relatively small. 
Some people have argued 
that immigration can help revitalize 
rundown neighborhoods, especially 
in declining cities. Joe Gyourko and 
I have demonstrated a clear link 
between housing prices, building costs, 
and housing reinvestment (investment 
in housing renovation, additions, and 
maintenance). A house with a market 
value below what it would cost to 
build a unit with similar characteris-
tics is not a good investment: the cost 
of replacing parts of the house that 
deteriorate over time is greater than 
the market value of what is replaced. 
We would expect landlords (and home 
owners) not to invest much in these 
units. Immigration pushes up demand 
and prices in rundown areas. If house 
values go from being below to being 
above replacement costs, we should 
expect major revitalization. In other 
6 For more on social security and immigration, 
see the article by Alan Gustman and Thomas 
Steinmeier.
Social scientists have studied whether, on 
average, natives are subsidizing or being 
subsidized by immigrants through the federal, 
state, and local tax systems.
cases (in which there are price hikes 
but units are above or below con-
struction costs both before and after 
immigration), changes in renovation 
expenditures will be relatively small. 
Immigration needs to be associated 
with higher prices in a neighborhood 
in order to bring revitalization. But 
higher prices are a necessary, not suf-
ficient, condition for revitalization.
NONMARKET IMPACT OF 
IMMIGRATION 
Immigration has many other 
economic and social impacts that don’t 
involve markets. We will consider two 
of these issues: taxes and crime.
Taxes. Immigrants come 
to the United States in search of a 
better life, but they can avoid neither 
death nor taxes here. Indeed, legal 
immigrants pay federal, state, and 
local taxes. Immigrant families also 
enjoy some of the benefits of public 
services and receive transfer payments. 
Social scientists have studied whether, 
on average, natives are subsidizing 
or being subsidized by immigrants 
through the federal, state, and local 
tax systems. 
Ronald Lee and Timothy 
Miller, two demographers at the 
University of California at Berkeley, 
concluded that immigrants are net 
contributors to the federal tax sys-
tem. New immigrants have relatively 
high labor participation rates and pay 
federal income and social security 
taxes. The taxation of immigrants 
through the social security system is 
a singularly good deal for Americans, 
since about 35 percent of immigrants 
emigrate back to their countries of 
origin after some time in the U.S. and 
never claim the benefits.6
But are immigrants net 
contributors to the total tax system, 
including state and local taxes as well 
as federal taxes? The National Re-
search Council found a small negative 
contribution (that is, native taxpayers 
subsidizing immigrants) in the case of 
New Jersey and a substantial deficit 
in California, once local and state 
taxes are taken into account. Since 
New Jersey and California are among 
the states with a higher proportion 
of immigration, immigrant families 
in these states are among the major 
beneficiaries of the school system and 
other local public spending programs. 
The results point to the fact that the 
net contribution of immigrants is very 
sensitive to local and state policies. 
Indeed, in the same study, 
the National Research Council found 
the fiscal benefits of immigrants 
for the average U.S. taxpayer to be 
positive, taking all federal, state, and 
local taxes and outlays into account. 
How can we reconcile this fact with 
the findings from New Jersey and 
California? Again, immigration has a 
mild distributive impact. In states with 
a major number of immigrants and 
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7 These results may be explained by the threat of 
deportation, but more research in the U.S. and 
other countries will help us learn more about 
this topic.
receive more than they contribute in 
taxes. In other states, taxpayers enjoy 
their share of the positive contribution 
of immigrants to the federal budget 
without requiring major additional 
expenditures. These two scenarios 
average out as a positive surplus for the 
typical native U.S. taxpayer.
An issue that has captured 
the attention of many researchers is 
participation in welfare programs. 
Economists Michael Fix, Jeffrey Pas-
sel, and Wendy Zimmermann, at the 
Urban Institute in Washington, D.C., 
summarized the main facts of the early 
1990s. Immigrants used welfare slightly 
more than natives (6.6 percent versus 
4.9 percent). However, welfare use was 
disproportionately concentrated among 
refugees and elderly immigrants. Non-
refugee, working-age immigrants had 
welfare participation rates similar to 
those of natives. In any case, changes 
in federal assistance programs in the 
late 1990s made it more difficult for 
immigrants to access such programs. 
Crime. Economists have only 
recently started to examine the impact 
of immigration on social interactions. 
Clearly, these interactions are impor-
tant in assessing immigration’s general 
impact.
Economists Kristin Butcher 
and Anne Morrison Piehl have studied 
one of the most controversial topics 
in this area: the relationship between 
immigration and crime. Their results 
are quite unexpected. They found 
that the incarceration rate of male 
immigrants was about two-thirds that 
of natives. The fact that immigrants 
tend to be incarcerated less often than 
natives (and presumably to commit less 
crimes) is even more surprising when 
one considers they have, on average, 
less education and earn lower wages.7 
Butcher and Piehl also found that the 
longer the time a foreign-born indi-
vidual had spent in the United States, 
the closer his probability of incarcera-
tion is to that of natives. These authors 
argued that “this suggests that immi-
grants may assimilate to the (higher) 
criminal propensities of natives.”
CONCLUSION
Immigration has been at the 
center of many policy debates over 
the past two centuries. Unfortunately, 
the discussion has not always revolved 
around the existing evidence. I have 
argued that immigration provides 
overall economic gains to a country. 
Indeed, the U.S. experience as an 
immigrants’ country is one of phenom-
enal economic growth.
However, there are winners 
and losers in the short run. The trend 
toward a relatively more unskilled im-
migrant population has been associ-
ated with mildly slower growth in the 
wages of low-skilled individuals. This 
effect is hard to measure, but it seems 
to be small. I have also argued that 
immigration seems to have no sizable 
impact on employment or unemploy-
ment in the United States.
Immigration has a positive 
impact on housing prices and rents 
in cities that attract the foreign-born. 
This benefits existing homeowners and 
landlords but makes these cities less 
attractive to renters and prospective 
native in-migrants. In the long run, 
these effects are bound to dissipate as 
immigrants and their offspring become 
Americans and leave the traditional 
port-of-entry cities.
The average U.S. taxpayer 
benefits from immigrants’ contribu-
tions to the tax system, taking all fed-
eral, state, and local taxes and outlays 
into account. But the impact is mild, 
and the average distribution of income 
through the tax system is not uniform. 
Immigrants’ federal tax contributions 
result in benefits to natives in most 
states with low immigration levels. But 
states with high immigration levels 
have higher expenditures associated 
with the increased burden on public 
services. 
The distributive consequenc-
es of recent immigration inflows can-
not be ignored, although which mix of 
distributive or immigration policies is 
better for dealing with them is a matter 
of opinion.
Finally, I have discussed that, 
in the United States, there is evidence 
that immigrants have lower propensi-
ties to commit crimes than natives. B R22   Q4  2003 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q4  2003   23 www.phil.frb.org
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